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The respondents in each of the above named cases
agree with the statement of facts set forth in appellant's brief.

STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
1. Revenue (statutes or statutes imposing liabilities
must be strictly construed.
2. There is no lien against the right to use water
or land for cost of deliv~ry of water unless specifically
so prescribed by statute.
3. Claim of State Engineer for services rendered
pursuant to 100-5-1 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
i,s not a preferred claim in receivership.
4. Purchaser of land and wate,r -rig·hts is not personally liable for obligation of previous owner in connection with distribution of water by State Engineer
unless he is specifically made so by contract or State
law.

ARGUl\1ENT
Appellant has cited several cases to support the
principle that a statute in derogation of common law
shall not be ~strictly construed but shall be construed
liberally with the view to effect the objects of the
statute and promote justice. Respondents in this case
do not see just where this principle has any application in these cases for it is not pointed out in appellant's brief what common law is in conflict with the
statute under consideration, namely, Section 100-5-1,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.-
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However, in this connection we wish to call the
court's attention to the case of Mormeister vs. Golding, 84 Utah 324, 27 Pac. (2) 447, which, in discussing
the construction of the statute there involved, states
as follo\vs:
"It is further well settled that statutes in
derogation of common law are strictly construed.
Consequently, the authority of the eourt or any
board or commission or department to procure
evidence by a deposition, and to use the same,
must be clearly conferred and authorized by
statute.''
From appellant's argument there i1s no question
but that appellant is contending that the statute above
mentioned is one 'vhich places a_ burden upon the rights
of an indiYidual or is in effect a revenue law or statute.
If this contention is true, and it must be true if appellants are to prevail in their appeal, then it is uniformly held by _the courts that such statutes must be
strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against
the taxing power.
59 c. J. 1129:
''A statute creating a new liability, or increasing an existing liability, or even a remedial
statute giving a remedy against a party who
would not otherwise be liable, must be strictly
construed in favor of persons sought to be subjected to their operation. Such statutes will not
be so extended as to include liabilities other
than those designated or fairly within its terms."
59 C. J. 1131:
''As a general rule revenue la,vs, such as
la"-:s imposing taxes and licenses, are neither

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

remedial laws, nor laws founded upon any permanent public policy; but, on the contrary,
operate to impose burdens upon the public, or to
restrict them in the enjoyment of their property and the pursuit of their occupations, and,
when they are ambiguous or doubtful, will be
construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer and
against the taxing power. How·ever, the rule
of strict construction should be applied with due
regard to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute, and it has been held that
revenue statutes should be reasonably construed
\Vith a view to carry out their purposes. and intent. It has also been stated that revenue statutes
should be c.o:rustrued strictly, i:Q. so far as they
may operate to deprive the citizen of his property, by summary proceedings or to impose
penalties or forfeitures upon him, but other'vise such s·tatutes ought to be construed "rith
fairness, if not liberality, in order to carry
out the intention of the legislature. The provisions of such statutes are not to be extended
by construction or implication beyond the clear
import of the language used; nor will they be
enlarged so as to embrace matters or persons
not specifically named or pointed out. In order
to sustain the tax, it must come clearly 'vithin
the letter of the statute, and the powers granted
to officers charged with its execution must be
strictly pursued. * * • ''
Woodring v. Straup, 45 Utah 173, 143 Pac. 592:
''The rule, as declared by the great weight
of authority, is that, in determining whether the
Legislature has granted to municipal corporations the power to levy and collect special taxes,
the statutes under which it. is claimed such
power is conferred are strictly construed. In
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Suth. Stat. Const. Sec. 363, the author says :
'' 'A due regard for individual rights and
the plainest principles of justice requires that
taxing statutes shall have only the effect which
the Legislature clearly intended; in construing
them all reasonable doubts as to such intent
should be resolved in favor of the citizen.'
''And again in the same section, it is said:
'' 'A statute conferring authority to impose
taxes must be construed strictly. A tax law cannot be extended by construction to things not
named or described as the subjects of taxation'.''
In 2 Dillon 's· Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) Sec. 763, the
rule is well illustrated in the following terse and conCise language :
' "It is a principle universally de,clared and
admitted that municipal corporations can levy
no taxes, general or special, upon the inhabitants
or their property, unless the pow·er be plainly
a;nd unmistakably conferred. It has, indeed.
often been said that it must be specifically
granted in terrrns; but all courts agTee that the
authority must be given either in express 'vords
or by necessary or unmistakable implication,
and that it cannot be collected by doubtful inferences from other powers, or powers relating
to other subjects, nor can it be deduced fron1
any consideration of convenience or advantage,'
Hamilton's' L~aw of Special Ass·essments, Sec. 195;
1 Page & Jones Taxation by Asses,sment, Sec. 229;
37 Cyc. 966; 25 A. & E. Ency, Law, 1171."
I.J. A. & S. L. Ry. YS. Richards, 52 Utah 1. 172
Pac. 474:
"The authorities cited by respondent to the
effect that laws relating to taxation should be
strictly construed against the taxing power. are
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acknowledged and approved. We recognize that
as thH law, and would readily apply it in the
present case, if there was anything in the case
to which it could be applied.''
In re Osgood's Estate, 52 ·Utah 185, 173 Pac. 152:
"While we are aware of, and approve, the
general rule, that a law which imposes a tax of
any kind or character cannot be extended by
construction between the literal terms of the
statute, yet we also recognize the rule that where,
as here, all property which passes by will is
within the express terms of the statute, then the
burden should fall upon the person who claims
an exemption under the statute to establish
that fact.''
Norville vs. State Tax Commission, ________ Utah --------,
97 P. (2) 937:
''The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in
case of doubt as to the intention of the legislature to be, construed strictly against the taxing a:uthority and in favor of those on \\'"hom
the tax is levied, has been well set out in the
case of Helvering v. _Stockholms Enskilda Bank,
293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed. 211. See,
al1so, Los Angeles S. L. R. Co. v. Richards,
52 Utah 1, 172 P. 474; W. F. Jensen Candy Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d
629, 107 A. L. R. 2·61; 25 R. C. L. Sec. 307 at
p. 1092; Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11, 4th Ed.
Sec. 503 at p. 1113. ''
In the opinion of respondents the statute in question clearly indicates that it W3.!S not the legislative
intention to create a lien of any description against the
right to the use of water or the land merely for the
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failure to pay the amounts assessed by the State Engineer. In section 100-5-1, which has been set forth in
appellant's brief, the State Engineer is merely given
the right to forbid the use of the water by any such
delinquent. In other words, in this case, had the White
Fawn ~lilling Company continued to u1se the water,
the State Engineer had the right to prohibit the use
thereof until the obligation was paid, and he had the
right to sue such user for the amount owing. Every
word used clearly states that the rights of the Engineer
must be against the person who incurred the obligation
and not ag·ainst any subsequent purchaser. Nor is there
anything in the section that even suggests or indicates
that the legislature intended that a lien should be
created and exist against the right to the use of water
or the land upon which it is used. And where the legislature desired to create a lien, it has done so in ~specific
""ords as in Section 100-5-4, which covers the question
of headg·ate:s and measuring devices. In this section
the follow··ing language is used:
'' * • * If the owners of irrig·ation 'vorks,
canals or reservoirs Rhall refuse or neglc~t to
construct and put in such headgates, flumes or
measuring devices, after thirty dayR notiee to
do so by the State Engineer, it ~shall be the duty
of the State Engineer to construct or cause to
be conRtructed such measuring devices and the
cost of the same shall be a lien against the
.lands and ''Tater rights served thereby."
And to attempt to give to the statute the construction that appellant insists should be giYen 'vould
be to go contrary to all of the authoritieR in this state
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and numerous others in construing revenue or tax
statutes. In order to sustain a tax it must come clearly
within the letter of the statute.
Appellant seems to rely entirely upon the case
of Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation Company vs.
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 283, 61 Pac.
(2) 605, to show that a lien exists in favor of the State
Engineer. However, thiS' case does not construe Section 100-5-1, Revi1sed Statutes of Utah 1933, as impressing a lien upon the water right but merely states
that in a. sense an unpaid water asHessment becomes
an encumbrance against the water right. The real
question decided in this case~, as respondents see it,
is that one who is receiving the beneficial use of the
water and service of the. State Engineer cannot by
contract, assignment, or otherwise, free himself from
the liability to pay the obligation. With this statement we heartily agree and concede that the White
Fawn Milling Company could not be relieved of the
obligation it owes by any transfer of its rightls and
accordingly the receiver has allowed the claim of the
State Engineer. Likewise, the ne"\v purchaser would
not assume the obligation nor become bound for the
same under the wording of the statute. As \Ve have
heretofore said, the statute clearly indicates that the
rights that the State Engineer has to collect the money
or to shut off the water are against the per1son who
incurs· the same and who obtains the beneficial use of
his services.
If the statute does not create a lien, then there
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can be no question but that the State Engineer's claim
in the receivership matter would merely be a common
claim for, as will be noted from the claim set forth in
appellant's abstract, the preference i!s merely claimed
under and by virtue of the provisions of Title 100, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933. It is not a claim for labor
nor for any other item held to be a prior claim in this
state in receivership matters, and we respectfully submit that the order of the court denying such claim as
a preferred claim and allowing it as a common claim
'vas prope-r.
If the claim of the State Engineer was not a preferred claim and did not create a lien then any subsequent purchaser would take title to the land and rights
to the use of the water without being obligated to take
care of the obligation created by a prior owner and
the State Engineer could not collect the same from the
subsequent owner nor could he deprive him of the use
of the water. This principle is clearly set forth in the
annotations appearing in 55 A. L. R. 789 and 13 A.
L. R. 346, and the case of Home Owners Loan Corporation vs. Logan Cit~v, 97 Utah 235, 92 Pac. (2d) 346,
""here thiR court stated:
"It follows from the above analysis that a
subsequent purchaser of pre,mises from which
is cut off the water supply is under no duty to
pay the arrears owed by a prior tenant or owner
or both as a condition precedent to having the
water turned on for use on his property unless he has agreed to be liable for the p-ayment
of the same.''
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I~ the ~og~n ~ase, ~ll p~rti(}s

~greed

and this
court helq that th~re was. no lien created by the ordinance ~hough t4e or~inance gave to the city the power
to shut off the water tm~il all arrears for the water
furnished had been paid. rhe laJ1gu~ge used in the
Logan law was:
'' * "" * may cause the water to be shut off
from such premises and shall not be required
to turn the 1same on until all arrears for water
furnished shall be paid in full. ''
The state statute in question reads as follows:
"* "" * may forbid the use of water by
such delinquent while such default continues.''
The language in the ordinance is almost identical
with that of the statute in question and it is apparent
therefrom that the State- Engineer received no greater
right from the words in the statute under discussion
than the city could have received from the words in
the ordinance.
Furthermore, can we say that a lien may be created
which would in any way bind a subsequent purchaser
of property unless. some method or provision is made
for the recording of such lien or the giving of notice
to the subsequent purchaser that a lien is claimed. Title
Guaranty & Trust Company vs. Allen, 256 N. Y. Supl.
400.

We therefore respeetfully submit:
1. That in the case of Louis L. Marks vs. White
Fa'vn Milling Corporation, Defendant, Walker Bank &
Trust Company as Receiver, and T. H. Hmnphreys,
State Eng-ineer of the State of Utah, as Appe11ant,
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the District Court was correct in entering an order
in the receivership matter ordering that the claim of
the State Engineer be allowed as a common claim but
denying that it had any preference over other claims.
2. That in the case of T. H. Humphreys, State
Engineer of the State of Utah, plaintiff and appellant,
and Maxfield Feed & Coal, Inc., defendant and respondent, that the District Court wws correct in entering
its decree dismissing the suit commenced by plaintiff
and appellant and contend that this court should affirm the decisions of the District Court in both cases.
EDWARD F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Resptondents
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